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Abstract The aim of this research was to examine condi-
tions that modify feminists’ support for women as targets of
gender discrimination. In an experimental study we tested a
hypothesis that threatened feminist identity will lead to
greater differentiation between feminists and conservative
women as victims of discrimination and, in turn, a decrease
in support for non-feminist victims. The study was
conducted among 96 young Polish female professionals
and graduate students from Gender Studies programs in
Warsaw who self-identified as feminists (Mage=22.23).
Participants were presented with a case of workplace gender
discrimination. Threat to feminist identity and worldview of
the discrimination victim (feminist vs. conservative) were
varied between research conditions. Results indicate that
identity threat caused feminists to show conditional reac-
tions to discrimination. Under identity threat, feminists per-
ceived the situation as less discriminatory when the target
held conservative views on gender relations than when the
target was presented as feminist. This effect was not ob-
served under conditions of no threat. Moreover, feminists
showed an increase in compassion for the victim when she
was portrayed as a feminist compared to when she was
portrayed as conservative. Implications for the feminist
movement are discussed.
Keywords Feminist identity . Identity threat . Gender
discrimination . Ideology
Introduction
In 2010 we celebrated the “Year of the Woman” in U.S.
politics (Parker 2010, para. 1). Many women, like Tea Party
leaders such as Sarah Palin and Christine O’Donnell, were
ranked among the most successful politicians of 2010 and
appeared to be on their way to becoming “the 21st century
symbol of American women in politics” (Holmes and
Traister 2010, para. 3). At the same time, women all over
the world continue to be under-represented in the majority
of political and business institutions. For example, only 14
countries have democratically elected female leaders
(Catalyst 2012a) and a gender gap still exists even in most
egalitarian societies (Hausmann et al. 2012). Also, despite
the socialist rhetoric of gender equality, gender discrimina-
tion remains an ongoing problem in the post-Communist
region, including Poland (see Catalyst 2012b; Graff 2003,
2007; Olson et al. 2007). For example, in the EU, compared
to other member states, the gender gap tends to be higher in
post-Communist countries (Hausmann et al. 2012). These
seemingly conflicting realities, in addition to the conserva-
tive, non- or even anti-feminist identities of many successful
female politicians, have left the feminist community some-
what puzzled. “Do you still cheer if the ceiling is crashed by
(…) conservative businesswomen?” wondered Sarah Libby
(2010, para. 3) in Slate, and several feminist journalists and
bloggers shared her concern during the so-called “Year of the
Woman” (e.g. Daum 2010; Douthat 2010; Harding 2010;Wall
2010). Such reservations may indicate little more than a
cautious attitude adopted by advocates for women’s rights.
Ongoing institutional and cultural sexism worldwide certainly
casts doubt on the “mission accomplished” undertones of
slogans such as “Year of the Woman.” Another, if somewhat
more cynical question may be asked by some: when does
feminist support become reserved only for fellow feminists?
We sought to address this question with a study conducted
among Polish feminists.
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The aim of this paper is to investigate the conditions
under which women that identify themselves as feminists
might show a decrease in support for other women. Support
for female political candidates expresses not only support
for other women but also for the gender-related policies they
might (or might not) endorse. Thus, in this study we inves-
tigated factors that can modify feminists’ reactions to
gender-based discrimination in the workplace as a more
neutral context. Drawing on theories of social identity
(Tajfel and Turner 1986) and social self-categorization
(Turner et al. 1987; 1984), the major question we address
here is how threat to perceiver’s feminist social identity
might affect their response to the victim of gender discrim-
ination. We further investigate attitudes toward a victim of
gender discrimination depending on whether the victim is
portrayed as sharing or not sharing feminist identity with the
perceiver. Specifically, in an experimental study we examine
the influence of the victim’s worldview and threats to fem-
inist identity on reactions to gender discrimination. We
investigated two components of response to gender discrim-
ination: compassion for the victim (Leung et al. 1993)—an
emotional component likely to increase victim helping (for
evidence from the U.S. see e.g. Batson 1991; Cialdini et al.
1987 and Poland e.g. Karyłowski 1982) and perceptions of
the situation as unfair which corresponds to the cognitive
interpretation of discrimination (Major et al. 2002; Roy et al.
2009).
Previous research conducted in the U.S. has focused on
factors that modify the perception of discrimination, includ-
ing whether the victim was an in-group member (Dodd et al.
2001; Garcia et al. 2005, 2010; Schmitt et al. 2003) or
whether she was feminist (Roy et al. 2009). However, none
of these studies examined ways feminists react to discrimi-
nation. Feminists, across different cultures, are the ones who
are most likely to be sensitive to gender discrimination and
act against it (as shown in the U.S.: Cowan et al. 1992;
Duncan 1999; Myaskovsky and Wittig 1997; Nelson et al.
2008; Williams and Wittig 1997; Zucker 2004; see also
Graff 2003, on Poland). Because they are advocates for
gender equality and the actors of social change, it is impor-
tant to know what factors might influence their perception of
gender issues. It is especially important to know what
modifies perceptions of discrimination among feminists
in contexts where research on feminist movement is still
scarce. Hence, we test our research questions in Poland,
among female graduate students and young profes-
sionals who self-identify as feminists. We will discuss
the specific cultural context in which the study was
conducted and demonstrate its relevance to the under-
standing of feminist attitudes and discrimination in other
cultures. We then outline our empirical predictions by
discussing the role of the target’s social identity and
threat in responses to discrimination.
Gender Equality and Feminism in Poland
Despite “illusions of egalitarianism” (Malinowska 1995, p.
35) crafted by the Communist system, gender equality has
not been achieved in post-Communist Poland (Graff 2007;
Hausmann et al. 2012; Marsh 2009; see also Malinowska
1995; Olson et al. 2007). While Communism increased
representation of women in the job market, it sustained
gender inequality by employing them mostly in low-status
jobs and increasing the burdens placed on them (Marsh
2009; Mathews et al. 2005; Olson et al. 2007). Enduring
these burdens and sacrificing oneself for the family has been
seen as a unique virtue expected from Polish women (Graff
2007).
Nevertheless, just after the system changed there were
strong doubts about the existence of a movement that would
take upon itself the struggle for greater gender equality
(Bystydzienski 2001; Graff 2003). Feminist ideas were be-
ing rejected because of their association with Communism
and opposi t ion from a revived Catholic church
(Bystydzienski 2001; Graff 2003, 2007; Marsh 2009).
Fortunately, the situation has been slowly changing. As
Graff (2003) put it: “whatever one’s definition of feminism
(…), there is no doubt that it does exist in today’s Poland”
(p. 101). Several large feminist organizations exist in
Poland, including eFKa (www.efka.org.pl) & Feminoteka
(www.feminoteka.pl), both aiming to support female soli-
darity and to counteract gender discrimination, Polish
Federation for Women and Family Planning, focusing on
reproductive rights (http://www.federa.org.pl), and
Women’s March 8th Agreement, organizing annual feminist
manifestation Manifa (www.manifa.org), among others.
Despite its unique history, Polish feminism bears some
similarities to the movements in countries with a longer
feminist tradition (Graff 2003, 2007). First, it uses third
wave tactics (such as irony and pop cultural references;
Graff 2003) although it is focused on issues and goals
associated with second wave feminism. A major concern
of Polish feminists has traditionally centered on abortion
rights, but domestic violence, employment equality, and
issues of political representation have made their way to
the agenda (Graff 2003). Second, despite being a relatively
young movement in the Polish society, it is experiencing
anti-feminist backlash (Bystydzienski 2001; Graff 2003,
2007). Because of these similarities, our examination of
the effects of social identity and threat on feminists’ atti-
tudes towards victims of gender discrimination can be in-
formative not only for the movement in Poland but also for
feminists in other countries. Moreover, it has the potential to
provide information about feminism in the understudied post-
Communist region (notable exceptions of studies from Sex
Roles include Henderson-King and Zhermer 2003, on Russia,
and Mathews et al. 2005, on Hungary).
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Feminist Identity and Gender Discrimination
The embattled state of both the historical and contemporary
term across the world notwithstanding, feminist attitudes are
generally defined as beliefs in the goal of gender equality in
the social system (Williams and Wittig 1997; Zucker 2004).
Feminist identity, on the other hand, is typically defined as a
collective or social identity (Burn et al. 2000; Henderson-
King and Stewart 1994, 1997) and self-identification as a
member of a group of feminists (Ashmore et al. 2004; Eisele
and Stake 2008). Feminist identification among women re-
flects identity of a woman and a feminist. Indeed, feminist
self-identification is not only a predictor of feminist attitudes
but has also been shown to be a predictor of collective
action on behalf of women in the U.S. (Breinlinger and
Kelly 1994; Cowan et al. 1992; Nelson et al. 2008;
Williams and Wittig 1997). For example, Zucker (2004)
found that U.S. women who self-identify as feminists show
higher scores of feminist consciousness and feminist activ-
ism than do liberal egalitarians, defined as those who sup-
port the equality of women and men but simultaneously
reject feminist identity.
Based on this evidence, feminist identity can be viewed
as a politicized collective identity—a form of collective
identity that underlies group members’motivation to engage
in power struggle between groups (shown for instance in the
U.S. and Germany; Simon et al. 1998; Simon and
Klandermans 2001), or opinion-based identity—a predictor
of political behavioral intentions (as demonstrated in
Romania and Australia by Bliuc et al. 2007). Feminist
identity, then, constitutes a special case of female identity
organized around endorsement of equal rights for women
(e.g. Duncan 1999). Thus, in principle feminists should
support striving for equality on behalf of all women regard-
less of these women’s views, convictions or background
(Gillis et al. 2004).
At the same time, feminist identity has classically been
defined in opposition to some specific worldviews, such as
conservative ideology (see Liss et al. 2001 in the U.S. and
Frąckowiak-Sochańska 2011 in Poland). Because of their
self-definition against traditionalism and political conserva-
tism, feminists might be likely to engage in differentiation
(Jetten et al. 2004) between women who hold traditional or
conservative views versus feminist or liberal views. Thus,
feminists may see conservative women as out-group mem-
bers. Taking this observation a step further, feminists’ re-
actions to gender-based discrimination might depend on
sharing social identity with discrimination victims (Tajfel
and Turner 1986; Turner et al. 1987).
Previous studies demonstrate that members of in-groups
and out-groups who experience discrimination are
responded to differently. Several studies conducted in the
U.S. (Dodd et al. 2001; Garcia et al. 2010; Schmitt et al.
2003) demonstrate that individuals who challenge discrim-
ination trigger positive responses from in-group members.
This is most likely when the situation is unambiguous
(Dodd et al. 2001; Schmitt et al. 2003), but the response
might become negative in instances that are not clearly
discriminatory or when victims’ behavior violates in-group
norms (as shown in the U.S. by Garcia et al. 2005; Kaiser et
al. 2006; Kaiser and Miller 2001). If reactions to gender-
based discrimination are affected by the social identity of
the victim, it is also possible that feminists’ response to
discrimination will depend on whether the victim is an
out-group member (a conservative woman) or an in-group
member (a fellow feminist). We hypothesize that feminists
will show more support to discrimination victim when they
believe she holds feminist views but their response will be
less positive when the victim is believed to hold conserva-
tive views on gender relations.
Threats to Feminist Identity
Similar to other movements that represent disadvantaged
groups, feminism is a frequent target of backlash criticism
in the U.S. (Burn et al. 2000; Haddock and Zanna 1994;
Twenge and Zucker 1999). Typical accusations revolve
around feminists being “anti-family” or “man-hating” and
“frustrated radicals” (Kamen 1991). Anti-feminist backlash
seems to be present even in countries without a long tradi-
tion of gender equality efforts, such as post-Communist
Poland (Frąckowiak-Sochańska 2011; Graff 2003, 2007;
Marsh 2009) and the Czech Republic (Heitlinger 1996).
This is reflected in negative stereotypes about feminists that
are similar in content to those prevalent in the U.S.
(Frąckowiak-Sochańska 2011; Heitlinger 1996). The con-
tentious position of the term is one reason that some women,
despite favoring feminist goals, might be hesitant to call
themselves feminists (a phenomenon noted e.g. in the
U.S.: Ramsey et al. 2007; Williams and Wittig 1997;
Zucker 2004, and Poland, Frąckowiak-Sochańska 2011).
Backlash criticism reflects a threat to the value of feminist
group membership (see Branscombe et al. 1999a and Riek
et al. 2006 for a discussion on how it differs from other
types of identity threats such as categorization, distinctive-
ness, or acceptance threats). In this paper we examine the
consequences of such value threat to feminist identity for
reactions of feminists to gender discrimination against wom-
en who do or do not share feminist views.
Prior research conducted in the U.S. and Canada suggests
that threat in general leads to stronger conviction in and
defense of one’s beliefs (McGregor et al. 2007; McGregor
and Jordan 2007). Moreover, value threats to group identity
may cause group members (especially the high identifiers)
to stress group homogeneity, cohesiveness, and loyalty (as
shown in the Netherlands, Doosje et al. 1995; Ellemers et al.
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1997 and the U.S., Branscombe et al. 1999b; see also
Branscombe et al. 1999a; Turner et al. 1984). It is possible
that threat to feminist identity has the potential to strengthen
the organizing value of the group: gender equality. In cases
of gender discrimination, therefore, the experience of a
threat to feminist identity may cause feminists to become
even more sensitive to situations of gender discrimination
and more supportive to its victims.
However, an alternative perspective is that threat to group
value may lead to an increase in intergroup differentiation and
in-group enhancement (demonstrated in the U.S.,
Branscombe and Wann 1994, and the Netherlands, Jetten et
al. 2001; Spears et al. 1999; see also Ellemers et al. 2002;
Tajfel and Turner 1986). Hence, threats to feminist identity
may increase the salience of feminist identity over the female
identity and, thus, strengthen the distinction between feminist
in-group and conservative out-group. Therefore, when femi-
nist identity is threatened, feminists might be motivated to
emphasize the differences between those who do and do not
share their worldview. If this is the case, especially under
conditions of threat, reactions to gender-based discrimination
may depend on the perceived social identity of the victim. If
the victim shares a feminist worldview (i.e. is a member of the
feminist in-group), identity threat may lead to an interpretation
of the discriminatory situation as more unfair and to greater
expressed compassion for the victim. However, if the victim
holds conservative beliefs on gender roles and relations, iden-
tity threat may lead feminists to interpret the gender discrim-
ination situation as less unfair and, thus, express less
compassion for the victim.
Overview of the Study
The aim of the present study is to investigate the conditions
that could moderate reactions of Polish self-identified femi-
nists to gender discrimination. Our first set of hypotheses
predicts a main effect for threat to feminist identity. We
predicted that, compared to a no threat condition, under threat
feminists will be more sensitive to discrimination, manifested
by perceiving the situation as more unfair (Hypothesis 1a) and
showing more compassion to the discrimination victim
(Hypothesis 1b). We also predicted a main effect for feminist
identity of the victim. We suggest that compared to a feminist
victim (an in-group member), when the target is presented as
conservative (an out-group member) feminists will perceive
the situation as less unfair (Hypothesis 2a) and show less
compassion to the discrimination victim (Hypothesis 2b).
Our third set of hypotheses predicts an interaction between
target views and threat. We suggest that when threatened,
feminist identity will lead to greater differentiation between
feminist and conservative victims of discrimination, and there-
fore less compassion and fewer attributions of discrimination
when the victim is non-feminist. More precisely, we
hypothesized that when situationally threatened, feminists
would perceive discriminatory treatment of a woman to be
less fair (Hypothesis 3a) and show more compassion
(Hypothesis 3b) when the victim is presented as a fellow
feminist as compared to when the victim is presented as a
non-feminist. We also predicted that, compared to a low-threat
condition, when the feminist identity is threatened, unfairness
experienced by a non-feminist victim of discrimination will be
perceived as less severe (Hypothesis 3c) and deserving less
compassion (Hypothesis 3d).
Furthermore, we examined whether the two responses to
discrimination will be related by testing the hypothesis that
perceptions of unfairness would mediate the relationship
between victim’s views and compassion in response to
discrimination. We expected that under threat the decreased
compassion towards the conservative victim will be driven
by attributions of responsibility to the victim rather than to
unfair decision-makers (Heider 1958). In other words, we
predicted an indirect effect of the feminist views manipula-
tion on compassion via perceived unfairness only in the
threat condition (Hypothesis 4).
To test these hypotheses, we conducted an experiment
that manipulated threat to feminist identity and examined its
effects on reactions to gender discrimination against a fem-
inist or a conservative woman. Because feminists might
differ in their strength of support for feminist ideology,
which in turn might affect their reactions to discrimination
(e.g. Morgan 1996, in the U.S. and Becker and Wagner
2009, in Germany), in testing our predictions we controlled
for strength of feminist ideology in our study.
Method
Participants
The study was conducted in 2009. Participants were pre-
dominantly recruited among students of postgraduate
Gender Studies of Institute of Social Sciences, University
of Warsaw, which cover sociology, psychology, law, history,
theories of culture, and literature from the gender identity
perspective. Some questionnaires were also distributed
among undergraduate students attending classes on
Psychology of Gender and Women Studies at the
University of Warsaw. Finally, some participants were
recruited during the 1st Congress of Women held in
Warsaw and among young professionals with a snowball
technique. At the beginning of the study participants were
asked whether they identify with feminists as a group. Only
participants who self-identified as feminists were included
in the sample. The initial sample included participants with
age ranging from 19 to 40. The fact that our older partici-
pants were likely brought up under Communism could have
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affected their views on gender relations. Therefore, to main-
tain homogeneity of the sample, we included in the analyses
only participants below the age of 30. The final sample
consisted of 96 females. All of them were White and of
Polish nationality. Their age ranged from 19 to 29 (M=
22.23, SD=2.51).
Procedure
First, participants stated their identification with feminists as
a group and filled in a measure of support for feminist
ideology (Hankiewicz 2006). Next, they were then random-
ly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. The study
had a 2 (identity threat vs. control) x 2 (feminist vs. conser-
vative views of discrimination victim) design.
We manipulated threat to feminist identity by having par-
ticipants read excerpts from an Internet forum discussion (see
Appendix A for instructions and manipulation text). In the
group identity threat (experimental) condition participants
were presented with an excerpt that was critical/threatening
of the feminist movement. In the control condition the excerpt
included neutral opinions. The forum was presented as focus-
ing on female issues. Effectiveness of the manipulation was
checked with one item measuring perceived valence of the
opinions: “Based on these excerpts, how do you assess the
attitude of these women towards feminism?” (in Polish “Jak z
powyższych wypowiedzi oceniasz stosunek tych kobiet do
feministek?”). Participants could mark their answers on a
scale from 1 (definitely negative) to 7 (definitely positive).
Later, we directed participants to read about an unfair
promotion decision in which a marketing company chose
not to grant a highly qualified woman (Anna B.) a manage-
rial position in the firm and instead promoted a less qualified
man. Participants were handed CVs and cover letters of the
two candidates. The materials were prepared in such way
that the female candidate’s qualifications seemed higher
than the male candidate’s. After reading through the mate-
rials, participants received information that the company
had decided to promote the male candidate. Also, to
strengthen the perception of discrimination, participants
learned that this decision was surprising to the candidate’s
co-workers who thought that the female candidate was more
qualified for this position than the male candidate. In this
way, we sought to create the impression that the female
candidate was a victim of gender discrimination.
The second experimental manipulation was embedded in
the promotionmaterials of the female employee/discrimination
victim (the male candidate materials were the same across all
research conditions). By varying the content of the CV and
cover letter we manipulated her views to be either conservative
or feminist (see Appendix B for manipulation text and instruc-
tions). In the feminist views condition the female candidate’s
CV included information about having an additional degree in
Gender Studies and her cover letter mentioned collaboration
with a feminist organization. In the conservative views condi-
tion an additional degree in Eastern Studies and collaboration
with an organization that supports traditional values were
mentioned instead. A one-item manipulation check was used:
“The views of Anna B. [the character] are close to mine” (in
Polish “Poglądy Anny B. są mi bliskie”). Participants were
asked to what extent this sentence was true on a scale from 1
(definitely disagree) to 5 (definitely agree). Afterwards, partic-
ipants were asked to respond to measures of perceptions of the
situation as unfair and compassion for the victim. Then partic-
ipants were thanked and carefully debriefed. The whole pro-
cedure took around 25 min.
Measures
Perception of the situation as unfair was measured with
eight items adopted from Basińska (2006, see Appendix
C). Participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1
(completely disagree) to 5 (definitely agree) to what
extent they agreed with these statements. Scores on all
items were averaged to create a measure of perception
of the situation as unfair (α=.79).
Compassion was measured as a DV with two items
capturing sympathy for the victim (Basińska 2006, see
Appendix C). Participants were asked to rate on a scale from
1 (completely disagree) to 5 (definitely agree) to what extent
they agreed with these statements. The two items were
positively correlated, r (94)=.49, p<.001, so their scores
were averaged to create a measure of compassion.
Support for Feminist Ideology
We also controlled for the strength of support for feminist
ideology. This variable was measured with 11 items (see
Appendix C) from the Polish adaptation (Hankiewicz 2006)
of the Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale devel-
oped by Morgan (1996). Participants were asked to what
extent they agree with these statements. Their answers could
range from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (definitely agree).
All items were averaged to create a measure of support for
feminist ideology (α=.87).
Results
Descriptive and Correlational Analyses
Means and standard deviations for all continuous variables
are presented in Table 1. On average participants showed
fairly high endorsement of feminist ideology confirming
that the sample consisted of feminists. Participants also
perceived the situation as generally unfair, and showed
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rather strong compassion for the victim. Correlations be-
tween our dependent and control variables were also com-
puted. Perceived unfairness and compassion for the victim
were significantly positively correlated, r (94)=.57, p<.001.
Both perceived unfairness, r (94)=.27, p=.01, and compas-
sion for the victim, r (94)=.30, p=.003, were significantly
positively correlated with strength of support for feminist
ideology.
Manipulation Checks
In the first step of data analysis we checked the effectiveness
of the experimental manipulation. A 2 × 2 ANOVA was
conducted to check whether the perceived valence of
presented opinions differed according to the two experimental
manipulations. Results revealed a significant main effect of
threat manipulation indicating that participants in the control
condition perceived the opinion as more positive (M=4.20,
SD=0.69) than participants in the threat condition (M=1.32,
SD=0.47), F (1,92)=573.47, p<.001, partial ŋ2=.86. Neither
the main effect of victim’s views, nor the interaction effect of
the two experimental manipulations, were significant.
Similarly, a 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted to check
whether the perception of target’s views differed according
to the two experimental manipulations. Results revealed a
significant main effect of the victim target’s views manipu-
lation indicating that participants in the feminist views con-
dition (M=3.57, SD=1.14) perceived victim’s views as
more similar to their own views than participants in the
conservative views condition (M=2.04, SD=1.27), F
(1,92)=37.62, p<.001, partial ŋ2=.29. Neither the main
effect of threat manipulation, nor the interaction effect of
the two experimental manipulations, were significant.
Experimental Effects
To examine the effects of experimental manipulation a 2×2
between-subjects multivariate analysis of covariance was
performed, followed up by univariate analyses of covariance
on the two dependent variables: perceived unfairness of dis-
crimination and compassion toward the victim (Table 2).
Because strength of support for feminist ideology correlated
significantly with our two dependent variables, we included it
in all analyses as a covariate (the pattern of results remains
similar when this variable is not controlled for).
The first set of hypotheses predicted that, compared to a
control condition, when feminist identity was threatened the
situation will be perceived as more unfair (Hypothesis 1a) and
the target will receive more compassion (Hypothesis 1b).
MANCOVA revealed that the main effect of threat was not
significant, Wilk's λ=.96, F (2, 90)=1.95, p=.15, partial
ŋ2=.04. Follow-up ANCOVAs confirmed that manipulation
of threat did not significantly affect perceived unfairness or
compassion. Thus, the analyses did not support Hypotheses 1a
and 1b.
The second set of hypotheses predicted that, compared to
a feminist target, when the target is presented as conserva-
tive the situation will be perceived as less unfair (Hypothesis
2a) and the victim will receive less compassion (Hypothesis
2b). MANCOVA revealed that there was a marginally sig-
nificant main effect of victim’s views, Wilk’s λ=.94, F (2,
90)=2.86, p=.06, partial ŋ2=.06. Follow-up ANCOVAs
indicated that the manipulation of victim’s views did not
affect perceived unfairness, failing to support Hypothesis
2a. However, in support for Hypothesis 2b, the victim’s
views manipulation significantly affected compassion for
the victim (Table 2). Participants were less compassionate
toward a conservative (M=4.01, SD=0.71) than toward a
feminist victim (M=4.31, SD=0.73).
The third set of hypotheses predicted an interaction be-
tween target’s views and threat on perceived unfairness and
compassion for the victim. MANCOVA did not reveal a
significant interaction of manipulation of threat and victim’s
views, Wilk’s λ=.95, F (2, 90)=2.32, p=.10, partial ŋ2=.05.
However, follow-up ANCOVAs indicated that the interac-
tion effect was significant for perceptions of unfairness, F
(1, 91)=4.35, p=.04, partial ŋ2=.05 (see Tables 2 and 3). To
test Hypotheses 3a and 3b we used simple main effects
analysis with Bonferroni’s adjustment for multiple compar-
isons. These analyses supported Hypothesis 3a that when
participants’ feminist identity was threatened, the situation
of discrimination was perceived as more unfair when the
target had feminist views (M=4.08, SD=0.72) than when
she had conservative views (M=3.75, SD=0.57), p=.02.
There were no differences between conservative (M=4.15,
SD=0.50) and feminist (M=4.07, SD=0.47) target’s views
in the no threat condition, p=.60. Furthermore, the analyses
revealed that when the target was presented as a fellow
feminist, perceived unfairness did not change in the threat
condition compared to the no threat condition, p=.82.
However, when the target was presented as having a more
conservative worldview, participants perceived the situation
Table 1 Means and standard deviations of all continuous variables
Variables M SD
Manipulation checks
Evaluation (1–7) 2.70 1.56
Similarity (1–5) 2.79 1.43
Covariate
Support for feminist ideology (1–5) 3.92 .63
Dependent variables
Perceived unfairness (1–5) 4.01 .59
Compassion (1–5) 4.16 .73
Scale endpoints presented in parentheses
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of discrimination as less unfair in the identity threat condi-
tion than in the no threat condition, p=.01, supporting
Hypothesis 3c.
ANCOVA indicated that the interaction effect did not
reach statistical significance for compassion toward the vic-
tim, F (1, 91)=0.31, p=.58, partial ŋ2=.003 (see Table 2).
However, follow-up comparisons with Bonferroni’s adjust-
ment revealed only a significant effect of victim’s views on
compassion in the threat condition (Table 4). In line with
Hypothesis 3b, when feminist identity was threatened, par-
ticipants reported more compassion when the target had
feminist views (M=4.22, SD=0.76) than when she had
conservative views (M = 3.88, SD = 0.81), p = .04.
Hypothesis 3d, predicting that a conservative victim would
receive less compassion in the identity threat condition than
in the no threat condition, was not supported, p=.12.
In the final step of data analysis, we tested Hypothesis 4
predicting that there would be an indirect effect of the feminist
views manipulation on compassion via perceived unfairness
in the threat condition but not in the control condition. To this
end we probed the significance of conditional indirect effects
of the victim’s views on compassion toward the victim via
perceived unfairness (mediator) depending on the threat ma-
nipulation (moderator). Feminist ideology was included in
this analysis as a covariate (the pattern of results remains the
same when this variable is not controlled for). We followed
the bootstrapping procedure proposed by Preacher et al.
(2007; Hayes 2009) to test for moderated mediation (Muller
et al. 2005). We used the MODMED macro (Model 2,
Preacher et al. 2007). For each level of the moderator we
requested 10,000 bootstrap samples. The indirect effect of
target’s views presentation on compassion via perceived un-
fairness was positive and significant only in the threat condi-
tion: the indirect effect had a bootstrap 95% bias corrected
confidence interval of .04 to .58 (Fig. 1). The indirect effect in
the no threat condition was not significant with a bootstrap
95% bias corrected confidence interval of −.26 to .10 (Fig. 2).
Therefore, we received support for Hypothesis 4.
Discussion
In this paper we examined factors that influence feminists’
reactions to gender discrimination. Participants, all self-
identified feminists, were presented with a description of
gender discrimination in the workplace. Results confirmed
our prediction that feminists’ responses to the situation
depended on who the victim of discrimination was and
whether feminist identity was threatened. The situation
was more likely to evoke greater compassion towards the
victim when the victim was presented as a feminist (an in-
group member) than when she was presented as conserva-
tive (an out-group member). Hypotheses predicting main
effects of threat were not supported. However, we found a
significant interaction of threat to feminist identity with
victim’s worldview on perceived unfairness. Analyses re-
vealed that under identity value threat the situation was per-
ceived as more unfair when the victim was a fellow feminist
thanwhen she was presented as conservative. Also, only when
the victim was presented as having conservative views, com-
pared to a low-threat condition, feminist identity threat de-
creased perception of the situation as unfair.
Table 3 Effects of threat and victim’s views on perception of the
hiring decision as unfair
Conservative Feminist
M SD M SD
No threat 4.15a .50 4.07a .47
Threat 3.75b .57 4.08a .72
Parameters that do not share the same subscript are different from one
another at p<.05
Table 4 Effects of threat and victim’s views on compassion for the
victim
Conservative Feminist
M SD M SD
No threat 4.15ab .58 4.41ab .70
Threat 3.88a .81 4.22b .76
Parameters that do not share the same subscript are different from one
another at p<.05
Table 2 Effects of experimental
manipulations on perception of
unfairness and compassion for
the victim
Results adjusting for support for
feminist ideology
Variables Perceived unfairness Compassion
F (1,91) p Partial ŋ2 F (1,91) p Partial ŋ2
Threat manipulation 3.13 .08 .03 2.81 .10 .03
Victim’s views manipulation 1.76 .19 .02 5.77 .02 .06
Threat x views 4.35 .04 .05 .31 .58 .003
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We did not find an interaction between threat and vic-
tim’s views on compassion towards the victim. It is possible
that the experimental manipulations affected cognitive and
emotional responses differently. The main effect of in-
creased compassion towards the feminist victim relative to
a conservative one might have overridden the interaction
effect. Nevertheless, follow- up comparisons indicated that,
in line with our predictions, in the threat condition
participants expressed less compassion for the conserva-
tive victim than the feminist one. Because the interac-
tion effect for compassion did not reach statistical
significance, this result should be interpreted with cau-
tion. More importantly, moderated mediation analyses
demonstrated that only in the threat condition presenting
the target of discrimination as feminist increased per-
ceptions of unfairness what, in consequence, triggered
greater compassion.
Taken together these findings suggest that threats to the
value of feminist identity (such as criticism of the feminist
movement) can lead to greater differentiation between wom-
en with feminist (in-group members) versus conservative
(out-group members) worldviews. This complements earlier
findings by demonstrating the role of social categorization
in shaping responses to gender discrimination (Dodd et al.
2001; Garcia et al. 2005, 2010; Schmitt et al. 2003). In line
with previous research conducted in the U.S. (Dodd et al.
2001; Garcia et al. 2010; Kaiser et al. 2006; Schmitt et al.
2003), this experiment showed that in the Polish context in-
group discrimination victims are responded to more posi-
tively than out-group members. Previous research pointed to
in-group norms and situational ambiguity as factors modi-
fying this effect (Garcia et al. 2005; Kaiser and Miller 2001).
Our study distinguishes threats to group value as another
moderator of the effect of social identity on responses to
gender discrimination. In this study, although the manipula-
tion check question suggested that the source of threat were
other women, ideological inclinations of comments’ authors
were not explicitly defined. Hence, they could have been
perceived differently dependent on the experimental condi-
tion. Future research would do well to examine consequences
of various sources of threat by manipulating them or control-
ling for their perceptions.
The present research also contributes to an improved
understanding of the role of feminist identity in responses
to discrimination. A study by Roy et al. (2009) conducted in
the U.S. analyzed reactions to feminist and non-feminist
Victim’s views  
(1 = feminist,      
0 = conservative)
Perception of 
the decision 
as unfair
Compassion 
toward the 
victim
0.21 (0.19)
0.40*(0.18) 0.58*** (0.15)
0.45*(0.21)
Fig. 1 Mediated effect of
victim’s views on compassion
through perceptions of the
hiring decision as unfair in the
threat condition. Note. Entries
are unstandardized regression
coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses, dotted line
indicates total effect (not
controlling for the third
variable) * p<.05. *** p<.001
Victim’s views  
(1 = feminist,        
0 = conservative)
Perception of 
the decision 
as unfair
Compassion 
toward the 
victim
0.32 (0.16)
-0.09 (0.14) 0.68*** (0.18)
0.26 (0.19)
Fig. 2 Mediated effect of
victim’s views on compassion
through perceptions of the
hiring decision as unfair in the
no threat condition. Note.
Entries are unstandardized
regression coefficients with
standard errors in parentheses,
dotted line indicates total effect
(not controlling for the third
variable) *** p<.001
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women who complained (or not) about gender discrimina-
tion. Regardless of complaining, discrimination was less
likely to be identified as a reason for the target’s negative
outcome when she was presented as a feminist compared to
when she was presented as non-feminist. According to
authors, the feminist label might be related to discounting
gender discrimination because feminists tend to be negative-
ly stereotyped as being hypersensitive to sexism. In our
study, feminist target of discrimination was responded to
more positively. Hence, we propose that an alternative ex-
planation of the results obtained by Roy et al. (2009) can be
offered by social categorization theory (Turner et al. 1987).
Because we have no information on the worldview of par-
ticipants, it is at least conceivable that participants perceived
the feminist as an out-group member and that this modified
their perceptions of the situation. Thus, our research stresses
the importance of taking into account the worldviews of
participants while assessing attitudes toward feminist vs.
non-feminist women.
Several alternative explanations for our results can be
proposed. First, it is possible that a conservative wom-
an, who might be less concerned with gender equality,
would be perceived as deserving discrimination that
“she asked for.” Therefore, the effect might be depen-
dent not only on the in-group/out-group distinction but
also on the specific stereotype of conservative women
held by feminists (see also Roy et al. 2009). A second
explanation is offered by in-group projection theory
(Wenzel et al. 2003), which states that people tend to
generalize typical in-group attributes to the superordi-
nate category and that this tendency is strengthened
under threat (an effect demonstrated in Germany by
Ullrich et al. 2006). It is plausible that when faced with
identity threat feminists were engaging in in-group pro-
jection by generalizing their feminist worldview to all
women. Thus, they might have regarded women who do
not share their views as less prototypical members of
their gender group and seen the decision concerning a
conservative woman as more deserved than those
concerning a fellow feminist. Further studies are needed
to investigate these possible mechanisms.
Our findings are likely to apply beyond feminism to other
social movements that are frequent targets of criticism. An
important challenge would be to discover ways to inoculate
feminists, as well as other groups, from biased responses to
identity threats. One approach is to examine forms of identi-
fication with their in-group. Recent research has distinguished
between genuine and defensive group identification (Golec de
Zavala et al. 2013). Defensive group identification can be seen
in terms of collective narcissism—an emotional investment in
an unrealistic belief about the unparalleled greatness of an in-
group, accompanied by underlying doubts about group’s
worth (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009). Defensive group identi-
fication is easily threatened and dependent on external valida-
tion, which has been demonstrated in various cultural
contexts, including the U.S., UK, Poland, and Mexico
(Golec de Zavala et al. 2009). In contrast, genuine mature
in-group identification is a realistic, well-based pride of
group’s positive characteristics (Golec de Zavala et al. 2013).
It is seen as a group-level parallel of individual genuine self-
esteem that is not easily threatened by criticism and does not
provoke hostility in response to threat (see Bushman and
Baumeister 1998). Such mature attachment to the in-group
can serve as a buffer against threats and shape a more tolerant
and inclusive group identity. Further research is needed to
examine ways in which genuine group attachment develops.
However, shaping such non-defensive feminist identity might
be a step towards immunizing feminist (and other) movements
to the effects of threat such as those reported in this study.
Conclusions and Implications
Feminist attitudes toward conservative female politicians such
as Sarah Palin is a complex issue that might not only depend on
support for gender equality in politics, but also on candidates’
standings on specific issues that are important to the feminist
movement (e.g. abortion rights). However, the effectiveness of
promoting social change towards greater gender equality de-
pends largely on feminists’ ability to recognize gender discrim-
ination when it takes place and react to it. In this study we
identified threat and victim’s views as two factors that might
influence this process. These findings have important implica-
tions for the feminist movement. Being aware of potential
biases can inspire feminists to reevaluate their relationship with
women that do not endorse feminist ideology. These results
also shed new light on the ways backlash criticism affects
feminists and their reactions to discrimination. Understanding
these processes can hopefully be a first step to developing
feminist identity that would be resilient to such threats. We
hope that our findings will then prove useful for established as
well as emerging feminist movements.
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Appendix A
Table 5 Threat manipulation with English translation
Polish version English translation
Instruction
Poniżej zamieszczono fragment dyskusji toczącej się na forum
internetowym Kobiety Kobietom. Zapoznaj się z nim uważnie, a
następnie ustosunkuj się do zamieszczonych niżej pytań.
Below we include an excerpt from a discussion on a Women for Women
internet forum. Please read it carefully and answer the following
questions.
Threat condition
Każdy wie, co to jest feminizm, ale czy słyszeliście o ruchu
antyfeministycznym, do którego zalicza się już nie tylko panów, ale
też kobiety…
Everybody knows what feminism is, but have you ever heard about the
anti-feminist movement, which includes not only men but also
women…
Moje pytanie brzmi: co myślicie na temat feminizmu, antyfeminizmu i
równouprawnienia?
My question is: what do you think about feminism, anti-feminism, and
gender equality?
Czekam na wasze wypowiedzi:) I look forward to your posts :)
~ paula ~ paula
Kiedy widzę te wszystkie zatwardziałe feministki, wychodzące na ulicę
i zwalające na facetów całe zło tego świata, mam ochotę powiedzieć
im: “Tak? To spróbujcie iść na wojnę, pracować w kopalni lub jako
drwale!”.
When I see all those hardened feminists taking to the streets, blaming
guys for all the world's evil, I want to tell them: “Yeah? Try and go to
war, work in the mines or become lumberjacks!”
~ julus ~ julus
Ja tam uważam, że feminizm i antyfeminizm powinni usunąć… to jest
normalnie głupie… nie wiem po co kobiety próbują na siłę coś
pokazać… ja tam wolę być normalna… przeciętna… i nie robić sobie
problemów z byle czego…
I think that feminism and anti-feminism should be abandoned… It is
just stupid … I do not know why women are trying to show us
something by force… I prefer being normal… average … and do not
make silly problems…
~patrizie ~patrizie
Większość feministek to brzydkie babochłopy, które cierpią, bo żaden
mężczyzna na nie nie spojrzy. Zazdroszczą ładnym kobietom
powodzenia, ale w myśl kobiecej solidarności postanawiają się
odegrać na mężczyznach i obwiniają ich o to, że im samym się nie
wiedzie. Dlatego poświęcają całą energię na walkę z mężczyznami,
żeby się na nich zemścić za brak uwagi.
Most feminists are ugly tomboys who suffer, because no man perceives
them as attractive. They are jealous of beautiful women's success, but
decide to take revenge on men and blame them for their own defeats
in the name of female solidarity. That is why they put all their energy
into fighting men and getting back at them for paying no attention to
them.
~assa ~assa
Dokładnie! Walczą o swoje głupie ideały i szkodzą reszcie kobiet, które
się niekoniecznie z nimi zgadzają. Możliwe, że wychowywały się
w jakimś chorym środowisku, gdzie mężczyźni krzywdzili kobiety.
Najwidoczniej nie wiedzą, że nie wszystkie kobiety cierpią i są
poniżane przez mężczyzn.
Exactly! They fight for their silly ideals and harm the rest of the women
who do not necessarily agree with them. It is possible that they grew
up in some kind of a sick environment where men hurt women.
Apparently they do not know that not every woman is hurt and
humiliated by men.
~Garbata ~Garbata
Ja osobiście nie spotkałam się z dyskryminacją kobiet, dlatego ruch
feministyczny porównuję z osobami, które uważają, że światem
rządzą Żydomasoni. W obu przypadkach wróg jest wyimaginowany.
I have not experienced discrimination against women personally, which
is why I compare the feminist movement with people who believe that
the world is ruled by Jewish Masons. In both cases the enemy is
imaginary.
~anne ~anne
Control condition
Każdy wie, co to jest feminizm, ale czy słyszeliście o ruchu
antyfeministycznym, do którego zalicza się już nie tylko panów, ale
też kobiety…
Everybody knows what feminism is, but have you ever heard about the
anti-feminist movement, which includes not only men but also
women…
Moje pytanie brzmi: co myślicie na temat feminizmu, antyfeminizmu i
równouprawnienia?
My question is: what do you think about feminism, anti-feminism and
gender equality?
Czekam na wasze wypowiedzi:) I look forward to your posts :)
~ paula ~ paula
Ciężko mi się odnieść konkretnie do feminizmu i antyfeminizmu. Z
jednej strony ruchy feministyczne są przedstawiane w mediach jako
agresywne. Ale kiedy słyszę o dyskryminacji kobiet tylko dlatego, że
It is hard for me to refer specifically to feminism and anti-feminism. On
the one hand, feminist movements are presented in the media as
aggressive. But when I hear about discrimination against women just
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Appendix B
Table 5 (continued)
Polish version English translation
są kobietami, to też nie jest w porządku. Najlepiej w tym temacie
chyba zachować równowagę.
because they are women, it is also not ok. I suppose balance is the best
solution in this case.
~ julus ~ julus
Co komu przeszkadza ruch feministyczny? To, że kobiety się
aktywizują, próbują sobie wzajemnie pomagać, walczą o prawo
wyboru dla tych kobiet, które chcą realizować się nieco inaczej, niż
widzieliby to “konserwatyści”.
Who is bothered by feminist movement? The fact that women are
active, trying to help one another and are fighting for the right to
choose for these women who want live their live slightly different
than “conservatives” would see it. I do not understand … You do not
have to be a feminist. No one is forcing you to do that.Nie rozumiem… Feministką można nie być. Nikt na siłę nie zmusza.
~ViolaRebel ~ViolaRebel
Ale organizacje feministyczne, przedstawiając się nader często jako
“organizacje kobiece”, sugerują tym samym, że wypowiadają się
w imieniu wszystkich kobiet. Ja akurat się z ich poglądami nie
utożsamiam, moim zdaniem kobiety mają prawo wyboru.
But feminist organizations, presenting themselves too often as
“women’s organizations”, suggest that they are speaking on behalf of
all women. I do not agree with their views, in my opinion women
have the right to choose.
~Leica ~Leica
Niestety organizacje nie-feministyczne [często anty-feministyczne]
również przedstawiają się jako organizacje kobiece, sugerując tym
samym, że wypowiadają się w imieniu kobiet en bloc . Co dla mnie,
jako jednej z tych kobiet, jest nieco obraźliwe.
Unfortunately, non-feminist organizations [often anti-feminist] also
present themselves as women’s organizations, suggesting that they
speak on behalf of women en bloc. Which for me, as one of those
women, is a bit offensive.
~patrizie ~patrizie
Niech feministki robią, co jest do zrobienia, wtedy nie będę mieć uwag,
tak jak nie mam uwag do działalności charytatywnej, domów
samotnej matki, przeciwdziałaniu przemocy, czy telefonom zaufania.
Mam uwagi do medialnej strony ruchu… same feministki mogłyby
nieco zmienić swój wizerunek.
Let the feminists do what needs to be done, then I will not have any
comments, just as I have no comments on charity, houses for single
mothers, prevention of violence, or help lines. I have doubts about
media aspects of the movement… maybe the feminist image could be
slightly changed.
~julus ~julus
Table 6 Victim’s views manipulation with English translation
Polish version English translation
Instruction
W pewnej firmie marketingowej niespodziewanie zwolniło się
stanowisko kierownicze. Na wolny wakat swoje kandydatury zgłosiły
dwie osoby: Anna B i Krzysztof F. Obie te osoby mogły się pochwalić
podobnym poziomem wykształcenia (ukończyły ten sam kierunek
studiów) oraz podobnym poziomem umiejętności niezbędnych w tym
zawodzie. Ich koledzy z pracy wskazywali jednak na pewną przewagę
Anny B, wynikającą z jej większego doświadczenia oraz poświęcenia,
z jakim wykonuje swoją pracę. Dlatego większość pracowników
uważała, że awans jej się po prostu należy, a decyzja szefa
pozostawała dla nich właściwie formalnością. Kandydaci złożyli
swoje aplikacje i oczekiwali na decyzję szefa. Niespodziewanie dla
większości zespołu dyrektor działu na wolne stanowisko kierownicze
powołał Krzysztofa F. Poniżej zamieszczono CV kandydatów na
stanowisko kierownicze. Dołączono także fragment listów
motywacyjnych. Zapoznaj się z nimi uważnie, a następnie ustosunkuj
się do zamieszczonych niżej stwierdzeń. Pamiętaj, że CV zawiera
standardowe dane o wykształceniu i doświadczeniu zawodowym,
podczas gdy z listu motywacyjnego możesz wyłowić bardziej
szczegółowe informacje o kandydatach!
In a marketing company suddenly a managerial position became vacant.
There were two candidates applying for this vacancy: Anna B, and
Christopher F. Both of them had similar education (graduated from
the same faculty) and similar skills required in this profession. Their
colleagues, however, pointed to an advantage of Anna B, who had
greater experience and was more dedicated to her job. That is why
majority of employees felt that she should be the one promoted, and
the boss’s decision seemed to be just a formality. Candidates had
submitted their applications and waited for the decision. Surprisingly
to the majority of the staff, Christopher F. was appointed to the vacant
managerial position. Below you will find candidates’ resumes.
Excerpts from their cover letters are also included. Please read them
carefully, and then respond to each of the following statements.
Remember that each resume contains standard data on the education
and professional experience, while the cover letter provides you with
more detailed information about the candidates!
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Table 7 Item wording for scales with English translation
Polish version English translation
Perception of the situation as unfair (based on Basińska 2006)
To, co spotkało Annę B. jest niesprawiedliwe. What happened to Anna B. was not fair.
Anna B. dostała to, na co zasłużyła.a Anna B got what she deserved.a
To, co spotkało Annę B. jest niedopuszczalne. What happened to Anna B was unacceptable.
Szef niesprawiedliwie potraktował Annę B. The boss treated Anna B unfairly.
Tylko Anna B. ponosi pełną odpowiedzialność za brak awansu.a Only Anna B is responsible for failing to be promoted.a
Annie B. należał się awans. Anna B. deserved a promotion.
Anna B. mogła uniknąć przykrego zaskoczenia, gdyby inaczej sformułowała
swoje dokumenty aplikacyjne.a
Anna B. could have avoided the unpleasant surprise had she
prepared her application differently.a
Szefostwo powinno bardziej docenić Annę B. The boss should appreciate Anna B. more.
Compassion for the victim (based on Basińska 2006)
Współczuję Annie B. I sympathize with Anna B.
Byłoby mi przykro, gdyby spotkało mnie coś podobnego. I would feel sorry if something similar happened to me.
Support for feminist ideology (based on Hankiewicz 2006)
Rząd powinien podejmować zdecydowane kroki w kierunku poprawy statusu
kobiet w społeczeństwie.
The government should take major steps toward improving
women’s status in society.
Kobiety w Polsce są traktowane jak obywatele drugiej kategorii. Women in our country are treated like second-class citizens.
Kobiety powinny się jednoczyć i podejmować wspólne działania, aby
zdobywać równouprawnienie polityczne i społeczne.
Women should unite and take common action to gain equality of
political and social rights.
Table 6 (continued)
Polish version English translation
Feminist views condition
Excerpt from the CV that included manipulation:
Rozpoczęte studia podyplomowe Gender Studies na Uniwersytecie
Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu.
Postgraduate Gender Studies at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in
Toruń.
Excerpt from the cover letter that included manipulation:
Od czasów studiów nieprzerwanie współpracuję z organizacjami
feministycznymi, m.in. z Fundacją “Ośka”, a także z “Bankiem Pracy
Kobiet”, którego celem jest zachęcanie kobiet do aktywnego
poszukiwania pracy i uniezależnienia się. Współpracuję także z
feministycznym czasopismem “Zadra”, które co miesiąc publikuje
moje felietony na temat równego statusu kobiet i mężczyzn.
I have been continuously working with feminist organizations since
college, among others with the “Ośka,” Foundation as well as the
“Bank of Work for Women,” whose goal is to encourage women to
actively seek employment and become independent. I also collaborate
with the feminist magazine “Zadra,” which publishes my monthly
articles about equality between women and men.
Conservative views condition
Excerpt from the CV that included manipulation:
Rozpoczęte Podyplomowe Studia Wschodnie na Uniwersytecie
Kazimierza Wielkiego w Bydgoszczy
Postgraduate Eastern Studies at the Kazimierz Wielki University in
Bydgoszcz
Excerpt from the cover letter that included manipulation:
Od czasów studiów nieprzerwanie współpracuję z organizacją
“Szpilka”, zrzeszającą kobiety o poglądach konserwatywnych, które
cenią tradycję i wartości religijne. W ramach organizacji
sprzeciwiamy się aborcji, wspieramy za to domy samotnej matki.
Nawet, jeśli decydujemy się być aktywne zawodowo, chcemy
zachować własną tożsamość, łącząc obowiązki żon i matek.
Współpracuję także z Wojewódzkim Ośrodkiem Kultury
w Bydgoszczy, gdzie prowadzę warsztaty gotowania tradycyjnej
kuchni polskiej.
I have been continuously working with the “Szpilka” organization—
associating women with conservative views, who appreciate tradition
and religious values. The organization opposes abortion, supporting
single mother homes instead. Even if we decide to be active
professionally, we want to keep our own identity, combining the
duties of wives and mothers. I also collaborate with the Regional
Cultural Centre in Bydgoszcz, where I teach workshops on traditional
Polish cuisine.
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